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Perspectives on Privatization and PlantLevel Industrial Relations: Great Britain
in the 1980s, Germany in the 1990s
I.

INTRODUCTION

Of the many sweeping social, political, economic and legal changes
resulting from the reunification of Germany,1 some of the most dramatic
and revolutionary are likely to be those affecting labor representation and
industrial relations. In the former German Democratic Republic workers and employers must contend not only with an entirely different economic and political system, they must also face entirely new systems of
labor law and employer-worker interaction transplanted from the Federal Republic.2 Industries in what was formally East Germany that had
been state-managed for over forty years are being dismantled and/or
privatized and the effects on the nature of industrial relations are yet to
I
be known.
This Comment will analyze the changing situation in Germany and
offer analogies based on a historical precedent. Though the degree of
change was much less revolutionary, Great Britain in the 1980s experienced a period of industrial privatization similar to that which is presently occurring in Germany. The purpose of this Comment is to examine
the effects of British privatization on plant-level labor representation and
industrial relations and to show how this experience may provide insight
into what is likely to happen in Germany during its period of
privatization.
This Comment will briefly compare and contrast the fundamentals
of British and German labor law. It will discuss the effects of privatization in the British labor relations system focusing on the changes in
1 Examples of such challenges facing Germany after reunification include reconciling the differences between East and West in infrastructure, see, e.g., Brand, East Germany: A Doubtful Future German LaborFaces Unification, 1990 DissENr at 468, 469; reconciling differences in expectations,
see, eg., Germany's Subdued Celebration, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 29, 1990, at 53; and reconciling
differences in work habits, see, eg., Protzman, A Worry in West Germany: Indolence in East Germany, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
2 For an analysis of the respective legal participation levels of formerly East German and West
German workers, see Markovits, Pursuing One's Rights under Socialism, 38 STAN. L. REV. 689
(1986).
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plant-level industrial relations. Finally, bearing in mind the differences
and similarities of the two countries' labor law structures and the British
privatization experience, this Comment will suggest how the German
Works Constitution Act may be utilized to provide for greater plant-level
negotiations and to ease the transition towards private industry.
II. COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND GERMAN LABOR LAW
A.

Preliminary Comments

Before comparing the British and German labor law systems generally, some preliminary comments are appropriate to keep the comparison
in the proper perspective. In comparing any two separate legal systems,
one must not view the law in a vacuum without considering the larger
societal factors affecting the law.' A comparison of laws is only valid
when legal norms are considered in light of their social context4 and historical genesis.' It is important to bear in mind also that different areas
of the law and different legal norms are affected differently by the underlying economic and social systems. 6 For example, a nation's criminal
code is less likely to have as direct a relationship to that country's economic system as would the nation's tax code. Labor law is likely to be
greatly related to a nation's social and economic goals, and, therefore, in
comparing systems of labor law and industrial relations, the relative economic and social policies of the comparative nations must be considered
closely.
As one point of departure, the commentator Wolfgang Daeubler
theorizes that there are two broad families of labor law within the capitalist system.' One family, including the Federal Republic of Germany
and the Scandinavian nations, is based on the idea of compromise and
partnership between labor and management.' In this labor scheme, employers and laborers are expected to work together in an institutionalized
atmosphere of cooperation with both sides able to communicate their
concerns in an effort to build consensus and foster shared decision-making. The other group, including Great Britain and Italy, is more influ3 For a more detailed explication of how industrial relations can be seen as an expression of the
society in which they operate, see Schregle, ComparativeIndustrialRelations: Pitfalls and Potential,
120 INT'L LAB. REV. 15, 28-29 (1981).
4 Daeubler, Comparisonsof LaborLaw in Socialist and CapitalistSystems, 4 CoMP. LAB. L. 79,

84 (1981).
5 Schregle, supra note 3, at 24.
6 Daeubler, supra note 4, at 88.
7 I at 92.
8 Id
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enced by ideas of social conflict.9 In this system, labor and management
are seen more as antagonists with both sides beginning at contrary ends
of the ideological spectrum. Compromise grows out of a series of alternating concessions by each side from their opposite starting points rather
than by a coordinated effort to choose a middleground initially.
B.

British Labor Law

Aside from the idea of social conflict, the British labor law system is
distinguished by many other factors. Perhaps the greatest distinguishing
characteristic is the degree of autonomy that both British labor and management enjoy. Traditionally in Britain, regulation of collective and individual industrial relations takes place "outside the sphere of stateestablished and state-enforced law."1 ° In fact, observers of the British
labor law system are likely to "gain the impression that in social reality
the autonomy of the collective bargaining parties forms the core of industrial relations in Britain."'" Unlike other systems which have distinct
rules and legal procedures defining the scope of industrial relations, in
Great Britain such a legislation-based structure does not exist at the
plant or company level.12
Since there are fewer state-established laws, the roles of custom and
practice 13 and voluntarism 14 are very important. By custom and practice
it is meant that the achievements or rights gained by labor are not officially defined and codified; rather these rights exist because both management and labor have agreed to accept them. A custom is not something
that can be stated in black and white terms, but it is something that must
be "fought for and secured by daily vigilance and activity."1 " Likewise,
voluntarism means that collective bargaining agreements are accepted
9 id
10 Kahn-Freund, Labour Law and IndustrialRelations in GreatBritain and West Germany, in
LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: BUILDING ON KAHN-FREUND, 1, 2 (Wedderburn,

Lewis, and Clark eds. 1982) [hereinafter LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS]. Otto KahnFreund's theories and scholarship play a prominent role in this Comment. Kahn-Freund spent the
first part of his professional life in Germany and the remainder in Great Britain, and he was recognized as the pre-eminent authority on Anglo-German comparative industrial relations prior to his
death in 1979. An advocate of incorporating social scientific techniques and ideas into labor law
scholarship, Kahn-Freund became during the decades following World War II, "the foremost labour
lawyer on both the national and international stage." Preface to LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, at vi.

11 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 2.
12 JId
13 Id. at 8.

14 Roberts, Recent Trends in Collective BargainingAgreements in the United Kingdom, 123
INT'L LAB. REv. 287 (1984).
15 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 8.
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willingly by employers and unions without the intervention of the state. 6
Attempts to specifically regulate individual industrial relations in Great
Britain have never been adequately implemented.17 Because of the paucity of state-established regulations in the British labor law scheme, the
informal concepts of custom and practice and voluntarism are the principle ways of defining industrial relations.
C. German Labor Law
In contrast to Great Britain with its informal voluntary structure,
Germany's collective labor law takes place within a dense procedural
framework that is often mandatory. 8 Labor law in Germany is made up
almost entirely of procedural regulations. 9 Whereas in Britain employer
and worker representatives have a great deal of flexibility in establishing
agreements, in Germany there are state-established procedures defining
precisely what may and may not be done. Neither party to the collective
bargaining is at liberty to alter the mandatory provisions according to its
20
needs.
The effect of this highly regulated system is ambiguous. On one
hand, the dense procedural network heightens predictability because the
parties to the industrial conflict are certain that what has been agreed
upon will in fact come about.2 On the other hand, the procedural requirements actually limit the behavior of the parties which might inhibit
the sense of security.2 In the same way that the strict behavior controls
define precisely what each party may expect to gain from the negotiations, the procedural requirements also prohibit and penalize any actions
which fall outside the guidelines.23
This feature of the German labor law system has been labeled by
various terminology. Kahn-Freund called it a "hypertrophy of legal
thinking"'2 4 or a "hypertrophy of the law and of the influence of lawyers
and the bureaucracy. ' 25 Other scholars have preferred the term
16 Roberts, supra note 14, at 287.
17 Mueckenberger, Juridification of Industrial Relations: A German - British Comparison, 9
CoMP. LAB. L. . 526, 541 (1988).
18 Id. at 539.
19 Id
20 Id. at 540.
21 Id.

22 Id at 541.
23 !.

24 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 3.
25 Id. at 6.
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'juridification." 26 Juridification expresses "the displacement of the contemplative by the 'activist' state and thus marks the way from the undisputed priority of contractual agreements to a 'law driven' society."'27
Juridification suggests a movement away from the informal, custom and
practice-based labor relations which predominate in Britain, towards the
more formalistic, state-defined procedures which are prevalent in
Germany.
D.

Differences and Similarities

There are historical bases for this fundamental difference in British
and German labor relations. It has been argued that the informality of
the British industrial relations system arose because a state tradition in
the classic European sense never developed in Britain. 8 Historically, the
British have been reluctant to establish a body of law regulating public
activities in civil society and the British have preferred informal networks.2 9 Another suggestion is that British labor law grew out of conditions of crisis to curb union power, whereas in Germany, the concept of
labor law accompanied economic growth and was a vehicle for the integration of the working class into the political structure.3 0 Kahn-Freund
offers the idea that in Britain the trade union movement preceded the
political labor movement while the reverse was true in Germany.3 1
Although there are many differences which distinguish the German
labor law tradition from the British, there are also some similarities.
Many of the substantive elements of both systems share common features. For example, both German and British labor law contain detailed
social security systems, plant legislation establishing working condition
standards, contract employment legislation and health and safety legislation. 32 Also, in contrast to a Marxist breakdown, the basic distribution
of power between capital and labor is very similar between the two
countries.

33

26 See, e.g., Mueekenberger, supra note 17, and Simitis, The Juridificationof LaborRelations, 7
CoMP. LAB. L. J. 93 (1986).
27 Simitis, supra note 26, at 93.

28 Gamble, Privatization, Thatcherism and the British State, 16 J. LAw & SocIETY 1, 13 (1989).
29 Id

30
31
32
33

Mueckenberger, supra note 17, at 531.
Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 2-3.
Mueekenberger, supra note 17, at 539.
Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 1.
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III.

COMPARISON OF INDUSTRiAL RELATIONS AT THE PLANT
LEVEL

A.

British Plant-Level Relations

With the fundamental differences and similarities in the industrial
relations systems of Britain and Germany in mind, one can see how these
differences reveal themselves at the plant level of labor representation.
In the British tradition, collective bargaining has taken place at various levels of representation and has been marked by diversity in structure.34 Although it has declined since World War II, industry-wide
representation still exists in many industries.3 5 These nationally-based
industry-wide unions have negotiated with employers' organizations
which, similarly, are nationally based along industry lines.3 6 Below this
level of bargaining, however, there is also representation and bargaining
at more local levels. 37 This stratification of labor38 representation extends
to local, district, and even plant-specific bodies.
The trend, however, in British labor representation since World
War II has been towards greater organization at the plant level.3 9 The
representatives at the plant level are the shop stewards. Shop stewards
are members of the workplace elected by the employees of the workplace,
organized by the trade union and accredited by the trade union leadership.' Because of the diversity in the collective bargaining structure,
shop stewards play an important role in negotiating with the manage41
ment at the plant level.
One of the fundamental roles of the shop stewards is to keep the
national trade union hierarchy in touch with its rank and file members.4 2
In a labor organization which is nationally based, there is a bureaucracy
of full-time administrative officials. The shop stewards ensure that this
labor union bureaucracy is exposed to the problems and concerns of its
"lay" element - the day-to-day worker.4 3 Unlike regional or national
union officials who visit the workplace infrequently, shop stewards are on
the spot, able to hear the complaints, frustrations, and ideas of the rank
34 Roberts, supra note 14, at 295.
35
36
37
38

rd
Ia
Ia
Id

39 Id.; see also Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 5.
40 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 5.
41 Idj

42 a at 7.
43 Id
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and file.' Kahn-Freund has suggested that this element of immediate
and on-going contact with the workers via the shop stewards offers a
guarantee against ossification in the trade union hierarchy. 45
Largely due to the existence of the shop stewards, direct industrial
democracy is a very important concept in British labor representation.
Direct democracy means that important trade union decisions are in
many ways made and implemented by the membership itself at the
workplace, as opposed to being made and imposed by distant elected representatives.' Since shop stewards, as local representatives, are accountable to the rank and file union members, the members have a direct voice
in labor relations. This ensures that the rank and file members are constantly engaged. The shop workers can justifiably feel that they are critical to union decision-making and therefore, trade unionism retains the
status of a workers' movement more than in places which do not allow
for such direct democracy.4' As the tradition of shop steward representation has become ingrained in Britain, and as the bargaining roles have
become crystallized by custom and practice, decentralization of union
decision-making has strengthened direct democracy.4 "
As shop stewards became established and accepted by the rank and
fie union membership, they also won acceptance by the companies that
ran the workplaces. 49 The role of the shop stewards was actually consolidated and refined by the emergence of professional personnel managers
at the plant level.5 0 These local managers sought to find common causes
with the shop stewards to concentrate on issues that were "of primary
importance to peaceful and efficient management of the plant."5 1 In this
way, there was an opportunity for greater interaction and discussion of
plant-specific issues at the local level.
Because these negotiations are decentralized, Kahn-Freund suggested that the effectiveness of collective bargaining could be enhanced:
"One of the principal aspects of this decentralisation... is that it can
make collective bargaining more comprehensive and give it richer content."5 2 Since the negotiators were locally based and had direct knowl44Id.
45 Id.
46 Clegg, Otto Kahn-Freundand British IndustrialRelations in LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, 14, 25 (Wedderburn, Lewis and Clark eds. 1982).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Roberts, supra note 14, at 296.

50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Clegg, supra note 46, at 24-25 (quoting KAHN-FREUND, LABOR RELATIONS: HERITAGE AND
ADJUSTMENT 8 (1979)).
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edge of the situation at the plant, agreements could address more
accurately the specific needs of the plant. Similarly, these negotiations
could prove to be more easily and efficiently accomplished than negotiations at higher levels of union and employer representation. 3
While the shop steward system grew more popular in Great Britain,
it did not come under any greater legal scrutiny. Like the vast majority
of British industrial relations, the shop steward system grew and became
established through tradition and custom, not through statutes or statecreated procedures. 4 Because the British prefer informal structure in
collective bargaining and labor representation, an attempt to place shop
stewards on a "legal" footing could be detrimental.
If there were a
formalistic legal structure defining the shop steward system, the shop
steward's role as a counterbalance to union bureaucratization would be
undermined as the shop stewards themselves would become more
bureaucratized. 6
B.

German Plant-Level Relations

As compared to the British system, Germany's system of labor representation at the local level has developed differently. The contrasting
systems are in large part a reflection of the fundamental distinctions between the two countries' industrial relations schemes.
The German system of collective bargaining has greater structure
than its British counterpart. In Germany, bargaining takes place at two
levels.57 Negotiation of collective bargaining per se normally takes place
at the industry level between regional bodies representing labor and management. 8 At the plant level, bodies called works councils are responsible for employee representation.5 9 Works councils' negotiations with
management at the plant level do not constitute collective bargaining
agreements in the legal sense of the term.' However, these localized
discussions involve certain issues that are subject to co-determination by
workers and management and are enumerated in the Works Constitution
Act of 1972.61 It is proper to compare the works councils in Germany
53 Clegg, supra note 46 at 25.
54 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 5-6.
55 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 7.
56 I
57 Fuerstenberg, Recent Trends in Collective Bargainingin the FederalRepublic of Germany, 123
INT'L LAB. REv. 615 (1984).
58 Id
59 Id
60 Id The local agreements between works councils and management affect only the individual
plant, whereas collective bargaining agreements affect the entire industry.
61 Id; see also infra, text accompanying notes 85-90.
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with the shop stewards in Britain because they both serve as the plantvoicing
level representational bodies and they both fulfill the function 6of
2
workers ideas in an effort to influence management decisions.
The commentator Friedrich Fuerstenberg offers three reasons why
union policy tends to be highly centralized in Germany. 63 The first reason is that historically, collective bargaining has taken place at the industry and regional level. 64 The collective negotiations are centralized and
tend to be held at the higher levels of representation, so it is natural that
union policy reflects this. 65 The second reason is that unions usually
have policies which include broad societal goals felt to be best implemented by the highest trade union officials who are able to take a more
general view than their local counterparts.66 The third reason for these
centralized policies most clearly highlights the differences with the British tradition. Commentators suggest that Germany's legalistic and bureaucratic labor relations structure requires experts to approach labor
problems most efficiently.6 7 These experts engage in detailed, centralized
negotiations which affect a great many workers throughout the union
organization nationwide. Fuerstenberg maintains that through the combination of the centralized collective bargaining negotiations and the localized works councils procedures, there is an effective balance in the
system of worker participation.6 8
As representational duties are distributed between the national and
local bodies, many characteristics are shared. An examination of the
works council's structure and role shows it to be a microcosm of the
general tendency of German labor law towards juridification. 69 While
the works council is held to be an element of cooperation and integration
between management and labor, it is still subject to legally acknowledged, binding rules.70 Kahn-Freund describes the works council structure as follows:
The German system of works councils, with its systematic organization of
election procedures regulated down to the finest details, and its clear definition (subject to the strictest legal control) of the rights and duties of the
62 Schregle, supra note 3, at 23.
63 Fuerstenberg, supra note 57, at 618.
64
id
65 This is also one of the historical reasons why works councils were able to develop in Germany.
Because of the industry level collective bargaining, works councils arose to fill the vacuum in representation at the enterprise level. See Schregle, supra note 3, at 23.
66 Fuerstenberg, supra note 57, at 618.
67 Id.

68 Id. at 626.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
70 Mueckenberger, supra note 17, at 551.
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works councillors, is perhaps the extreme example of the hypertrophy of
the law and the influence of lawyers and the bureaucracy which, seen from
71
the outside, is the central characteristic of German industrial relations.
The formalism which is characteristic of the works councils is also
reflected in the Works Constitution Act of 1972.72 The Act mandates
that all establishments employing five or more employees with voting
rights elect works councils. 73 The Act further provides that "the employer and the works council shall work together in a spirit of mutual
trust... for the good of the employees and of the establishment."'7 4
In Part II of the Act, there are detailed regulations concerning the
election and term of the works council members. These regulations include a specific schedule of how many members are to be elected in relation to the number of establishment employees," what time elections are
to occur,76 and how the elections are to be carried out.77 Much of the
language in the Act is imperative. 7 The procedural rules that are outlined are specific, comprehensive and usually mandatory.
Part IV of the Act, entitled "Collaboration by Employees and CoDetermination," outlines the substantive duties of the works councils.
As its initial principle, the Act requires that the employer and works
councils shall meet at least once a month to "discuss the matters at issue
with an earnest desire to reach agreement and make suggestions for settling differences." ' 79 This part of the Act calls for a conciliation committee to be set up specifically to settle differences between management and
labor and chosen in equal numbers by employers and the works councils.8 o Employers and works councils then negotiate and record works
agreements affecting the operation of the plant."1 As stated in the Act,
the works councils' general duties include seeing that effect is given to
regulations and arrangements for the benefit of employees, 2 making rec71 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 6.
72 Works Constitution Act, 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 13 (W. Ger), reprinted in 1972
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFIcE LEGISLATIVE SERiEs, Ger.F.R. 1 [hereinafter Works Act].

73 Works Act, supra note 72, part 1, § 1.
74 Works Act, supra note 72, part I, § 2(l).
75 Works Act, supra note 72, part 1H,div. 1, § 9.
76 Works Act, supra note 72, part II, div. 1, § 13.
77 Works Act, supra note 72, part II, div. 1, §§ 14, 16-20.
78 For example, "[n]ot less than eight weeks before the end of its first term of office the works
council shall appoint an electoral board of three persons with voting rights one of whom shall be
chairman." Works Act, supra note 72, part II, div. 1, § 16(1).
79 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. 1, § 74(1).
80 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. 1, § 76(1) and (2).
81 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. 1, § 77.
82 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. 1, § 80 (1).
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ommendations to the employer for further action,83 and receiving suggestions from the rank and file workers and bringing these suggestions up in
negotiations if they are found to be justified.,,
Listed in Part IV, division III are the matters in which works councils have a right of co-determination with the employers. These include
86
5
the distribution of working hours and breaks, leave arrangements,
and the fixing of bonuses and performance related remuneration. 7
There is also a subdivision dealing specifically with individual staff movements 8 including the works council's role in regrading and transfering
employees,8 9 and also its co-determination role in the case of dismissal. 90
It is obvious from this cursory overview of the Works Constitution
Act that it is a comprehensive and highly-detailed piece of legislation
defining the roles and responsibilities of the plant-level representational
body, the works councils. Like any administrative routine, it offers the
advantages of guaranteed, regulated, daily conduct which may diminish
the friction caused by an informal and more unpredictable code of interaction. 9 In its rigidity, however, it also loses the flexibility that a more
informal system would allow.92
C.

Differences and Similarities

The distinction between custom and practice-based labor practices
and formalized, codified labor statutes is the fundamental difference between British and German industrial relations. While Germany has the
detailed provisions and exacting regulations of the Works Constitution
Act, the British tradition shows "a complete absence of a statutorily regulated system of employee representation at the plant and company
level." 93 In Great Britain there is no counterpart to the German Works
Constitution Act. In fact, there is no statutory regulation of the sphere
of management and labor communication at the plant level at all.9
83 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV,div. 1, § 80(2).
84 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. 1, § 80(3).
85 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. III, § 87(2).
86 Works Act,supra note 72, part IV, div. III, § 87(5).
87 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. Ill, § 87(11).
88 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. V, subd. III.
89 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. V, subd. III, § 99.
90 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. V, subd. III, § 102.
91 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 6.
92 For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of such rigidity see supra text accompanying notes 21-23 and infra text accompanying notes 182-194.
93 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 5.
94 Mueckenberger, supra note 17, at 529. As Kahn-Freund points out, what is characteristic in
this area for Germany is the exact opposite of the British situation. Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at
3.
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Not only is there no formal structure to labor-management relations
at the plant level in Britain, but neither labor unions nor management
want one. 95 The shop stewards in Britain believe that they are performing the same representational function as the works councils in Germany, but they are able to operate without the "oppressively gigantic
legal apparatus of the works council system" as outlined in the Works
Constitution Act.9 6 In Britain, such a formalistic system is seen as actually diminishing the value of the shop stewards because it is perceived to
entail an unproductive bureaucracy as opposed to the present system of
unstructured and informal industrial democracy.97 In Britain, proposals
to formalize the labor-management interaction system have failed not
only because of labor union opposition, but also because of general management conservatism, which has yielded a lukewarm response to the
suggestion of a change. 98
Commentators perceive three main advantages to the British system. First, there are no statutory rules with which to contend, and thus
shop stewards and management are bound only to the more flexible, less
legalistic constraints of custom and practice.9 9 Second, shop stewards
counteract the alienation between the trade union hierarchy and the rank
and file constituents. 100 Partly due to their informality, the shop stewards represent an alternative to the strict trade union structure and serve
as an "integration factor." 10 1 Third, since the shop steward system is
based on tradition and tacit agreement between labor and management,
the shop stewards are deemed to promote industrial peace as opposed to
industrial conflict. 0 2 Since both sides of the relationship are bound by
unwritten rules, the theory is that both sides will eventually adopt positions closer to the center of the parameters without testing the extremes.
Steadfastly maintaining extreme positions would be more likely to undermine trust and invite reciprocity.
In the decades after World War II, Otto Kahn-Freund observed
that the role of the workplace representatives in Britain was becoming
more and more important and they were supplanting more of the duties
of the negotiators at the industry-wide level.'0 3 Informality and a lack of
95 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 5.
96 Id.; see also Schrcgle, supra note 3, at 26 ("Many British trade unionists would regard the
Federal Republic's approach to industrial relations as imposing a legalistic straight-jacket..
97 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 5-6; see also Schregle, supra note 3, at 16.
98 Mueckenberger, supra note 17, at 542.
99 Kahn-Freund, supra note 10, at 5-6.

100 Id.at 7.
101 Id.

102 Id. at 6.

103 Clegg, supra note 46, at 17.
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codification were typical of the negotiations between the plant representatives and local management."
Shop stewards were drawing their
power from below - being directly elected from the rank and file workers,
rather than from above - being delegated by the national trade union
10 5
hierarchy.
Nevertheless, Kahn-Freund and some of his colleagues believed that
the role of the shop stewards should be recognized and codified."l 6 They
felt that it was important to "embody the agreements in clearly written
documents instead of relying on custom and practice, oral agreements,
informal understandings and nods and winks."'"° Kahn-Freund realized
that this would be difficult for the trade unions to accept because the
roots in custom and practice were so deep.10 8 Although he recognized
that such restrictive measures could inhibit direct democracy," ° KahnFreund still endorsed more centralized authority in the Trades Unions
Congress and more centralized collective bargaining negotiations at the
national level. 110
Kahn-Freund's ideas, however, are inapplicable to the present time.
One commentator has maintained that, "[ilt is impossible to believe that
Otto Kahn-Freund would have maintained this prescription in the 1980s.
Today the idea that the trade unions can save society by an offer to engage in centralized bargaining has become not so much Utopian as
laughable.""' In both Britain and Germany, flexibility in representation
and negotiation, not rigidity, is required to meet the challenges of the
1990s.
IV.

PRIVATIZATION AND PLANT-LEVEL LABOR RELATIONS
A.

Introduction

The British experience with privatization has demonstrated the necessity for flexibility in plant-level representation and there have been
indications of the need for deregulation of the rigid structure in Germany
even before denationalization started.I" In Germany, by the mid 1980s,
104
105
106
107
108

d

Id at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25-26.

109 Ii at 26.
110 Id at 27.
111 Wedderburn, Otto Kahn-Freundand British LabourLaw in LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 29, 66 (wedderburn, Lewis and Clark eds. 1982).
112 The terms "flexibility" and "deregulation" have been used differently by different industrial
relations scholars. See, eg., Standing, Meshing LabourFlexibility with Security: An Answer to British
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unions were recognizing that works councils were better equipped to deal
with localized issues such as partial lay-offs and incentive pay schemes
than were national union representatives.1 13 German unions have tried
to strengthen their representation at the shop-floor level.' 14 Even before
the ramifications of denationalizing the state-run industries in Eastern

Germany, there was an awareness that German labor and management
must devise innovative approaches to handle economic and technological
change." 5 The need for such innovation stems from many factors, including volatility in economic conditions and diversity in workers' status

and life styles.1 16 Privatization will be one more factor contributing to
the need for flexibility in the German industrial relations structure. The
British experience with privatization is helpful in highlighting that need

for flexibility and innovation.
B.

Privatization in Britain

By 1980 a substantial number of the major industries in Great Brit-

ain were owned by the state. 117 There were two main reasons for the
increase in public ownership of industry in Britain in the years following
the Second World War. First, in Britain, the Labour Party governments

were ideologically committed to the common ownership of the means of
production. 11 8 Second, there was a desire to "use state control of these
industries as a means for national economic planning and postwar recon-

struction.""'

9

In the aftermath of the war there was the need to revive

Unemployment?, 125 INT'L LAB. REV. 87, 88 (1986) ("The essence of labour flexibility is, first, speed
of adjustment to changes in production and patterns of labour use and, second, adaptability and
availability of workers to the type of production taking place."); Vranken, Deregulatingthe Employment Relationship:CurrentTrends in Europe, 7 CoMP. LAB. L. 143 (1986) ("The principle of deregulation has generated governmental initiatives to reform substantially or even abolish major forms of
basic social legislation molding the employment relationship... The idea is to promote flexibility by
removing rigidities, with an ultimate goal to encourage investment and, therefore, employment.");
and Cordova, From Full-Time Wage Employment to Atypical Employment: A Major Shift in the
Evolution ofLabourRelations?, 125 INr'L LAB. REv. 641, 651 (1986) ("terms such as flexibility and
deregulation have cropped up. The former concerns contractual arrangements, while the latter is a
more general term that implies the elimination of certain regulatory and protective aspects of labour
legislation."). For the purposes of this Comment, flexibility should be understood to be used in the
broader, vernacular sense, i.e., capability to respond and change, while deregulation will refer specifically to an amendment in industrial relations legislation to remove rigidity.
113 Fuerstenberg, supra note 57, at 620.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 629.
116 Id.
117 Veljanovski, Privatization in Britain - The Institutional Constitutional Issues, 71 MARQ. L.
REV. 558, 560 (1988).
118 Id.
119 Id
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and reinvigorate the British economy. Due to the ideological bent of the
administrations in power in the decades following the war, government
officials chose a policy of industrial nationalization.12 0
In Britain, nationalization did not take the form of state-ownership
and state-management. 12 1 Rather than have the nationalized industries
run by public officials, the industries were to be run by a professional
122
class of managers operating at arm's length from the government.
Workers were not afforded any say in the management of the industries,
but they were seen as custodians of the public interest. 123 The role of
workers in the nationalization scheme was to ensure that the industries
were fulfilling the ideological purposes for which they were developed,
that is, maintaining public as opposed to private control of the means of
production.124
Nationalization, however, was always subject to criticism from various fronts in Britain. Business leaders argued that the nationalized industries presented artificial barriers to entry and thereby undermined
competition. 1 25 Public officials feared that nationalization gave undue
power to the labor unions. 126 Public sector industries were represented
by unions which were not subject to challenges by other competitive
labor organizations, due in part to the high barriers to entry in those
industries. In effect, the unions had a monopoly on collective bargaining
positions and they were able to exploit this situation to their

advantage. 127
In addition to this outside criticism, there were attacks on nationalization from within the government itself. As the nationalized industries
evolved, administrations became increasingly uneasy about their efficiency. 12 During the 1960s and 1970s a series of government White Papers described the movement of the nationalized industries away from
the original idea that they should operate at arm's length from the gov120 Id.
121 Id at 561.
122 Id
123 Idj
124 Id

125 Beesley and Littlechild, Privatisation:Principles, Problems and Prioritiesin PRIVATISATION
AND REGULATION: THE U.K. EXPERIENCE, 35, 40 (Kay, Mayer and Thompson eds. 1986).
126 Thomas, The Union Response to Denationalisationin PRIVATISATION AND REGULATION:
THE U.K. EXPERIENCE, 299 (Kay, Mayer and Thompson eds. 1986).
127 Id.; see also Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Remarks in the House of Commons No
Confidence Debate (Nov. 22, 1990) (reported by Federal News Service, Federal Information Systems
Corp.) ("Mr. Speaker, over the last decade, we have given power back to the people on an unprecedented scale... We've done it by curbing the monopoly of trade unions to control, even victimize
the individual worker.").
128 Veljanovski, supra note 117, at 561.

Perspectives on Privatization
12:216(1991)
ernment.12 9 By 1978, financial targets set by the government became the
primary instrument of control over the nationalized industries. 3 0 It was
felt that this development was in direct conflict with the purposes of the
nationalized industries as originally conceived. The change in attitude
towards public control over the nationalized industries had become so
great that by the end of the 1970s, "the principle that the nationalized
industries should operate independently of the government had been replaced with one premised on comprehensive, detailed, and direct regulation of their activities." ' '
The situation in Britain was ripe for change when the Conservative
government came to power in 1979.132 The Thatcher government saw
the nationalized industries as lagging behind in productivity, it viewed
public ownership as largely a failure, and it maintained a general distrust
for state intervention into markets.' 33 The government, therefore,
3
adopted the policy of privatization.1 1
Privatization may be defined most basically as "the transfer of activities and production from the public sector to the private sector." 135 But
privatization involves much more in practice. Often it involves liberalization of markets and changes in regulatory structures. 136 It also
involves changes in the concepts of property and incentive: "It [privatization] involves the transfer and redefinition of a complex bundle of property rights which creates a whole new penalty / reward system which
alters the firm's incentives as well as its performance." 137 Privatization
does not simply mean selling stock in a formerly state-owned enterprise,
rather it involves an ideological commitment to improve productivity by
increasing the role of free market forces.1 38
The commentator Veljanovski lists many objectives of privatization
39 Specifiwhich all fit under the general goal of promoting efficiency.'
129 Id. at 561-562.
130 Id
131 Id. at 563.

132 Lorenz, Thatcher's Industrial Revolution, The Sunday Times (London), Nov. 25, 1990
("When she (Thatcher) was elected on May 3, 1979, British industry seemed to be in terminal decline. It was wallowing in corporatism, hooked on inflation, and crippled by union power which had
filled the vacuum left by weak management. The slide in Britain's share of world trade seemed
irreversible. Not only was Britain the sick man of European industry, it was getting steadily
sicker.").
133 Gamble, supra note 28, at 5.
134 Id at 7.
135 Veljanovski, supra note 117, at 558.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 570.
138 Beesley and Littlechild, supra note 125, at 55.
139 Veljanovski, supra note 117, at 566.
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cally, privatization goals include creating an enterprise culture, increasing competition, reducing government involvement in industry decisionmaking and encouraging worker share-ownership in their companies. 4 °
Other objectives identified include elimination of waste, reducing public
sector funding of industry, enlarging an active citizenry, and contracting

state dependency. 141 As a generalization, privatization methods should
be designed "to maximise net consumer benefits, measured primarily by
lower prices and improved quality of service, rather than stock-market

proceeds."1

42

In Britain, the privatization scheme was seen not as one strictly
structured program, but rather as a set of various initiatives. 143 There

was no comprehensive plan for how privatization should proceed, rather
it took place through a series of ad hoc decisions and experiments.'"
Although the Thatcher government maintained that its privatization pol-

icy incorporated a coherent and well thought-out program, commentators have suggested that there really have been a variety of themes often
14
with conflicting implications.
One theme which clearly emerged from the privatization policy was

labor union opposition. An additional goal of privatization was the control of public sector pay and the weakening of the public sector unions'

power,'" and this was obviously not in the interest of the labor unions.
During nationalization, unions had gained benefits, including a greater
consultative role with management in the nationalized industries and

greater collective bargaining power. 47 With privatization, unions stood
to lose these advantages. Also, unions opposed privatization because in

practice, privatization usually did not include consultation with employees, nor were employees' rights given top priority by the government in
140 Ia

141 Gamble, supra note 28, at 11.
142 Beesley and Littlechild, supra note 125, at 55.
143 Gamble, supra note 28, at 4.
14 4
Id at 7. Gamble explains this idea earlier in his article at 4. "[Tlhere was no public commitment to denationalization either before the election or in the 1979 manifesto. The Conservatives
were committed to reforming industrial relations, and to running nationalized industries as commercial concerns, but not to selling them off. The government seems to have stumbled into the policy.
Having successfully piloted the sale of a few small publicly-owned industries and assets, ministers
began to realize that the principle could be extended. It was not until 1983 and 1984 that ministers
began to set out the principles behind privatization and to justify the measures that had already been
taken as part of a coherent programme."
145 See, e-g., Graham and Prosser, PrivatisingNationalized Industries: ConstitutionalIssues and
New Legal Techniques, 50 MOD. L. REv. 16, 18-20 (1987) (themes included increased competition,
fewer financing restrictions, and development of share ownership).
146 Gamble, supra note 28, at 11.
147 Thomas, supra note 126, at 299-300.
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its decisions.' 4 8
Faced with the threat of privatization, the unions reacted by following two general policies. First, unions drew much closer to the Labour
Party.149 The unions solidified their ties to Labour and kept in close
touch with Labour spokesmen on specific issues which arose because of
privatization.'1 0 Second, the unions enhanced their professional press
and public relations capabilities.1"' The unions, through their public relations arms, built alliances with consumer groups, lobbied Parliament,
1 52
and produced literature to publicize their opposition to privatization.
C. The Effect of Privatization on British Labor Relations
Despite union opposition, however, privatization did occur and it
led to changes in industrial relations in Britain. With the alternative beunions
ing the complete closure of plants resulting in the loss of jobs,
153
pragmatically accepted privatization as the lesser of two evils.
The biggest change wrought by privatization was a shift in power
away from the national labor leaders and towards the localized bodies.
In the nationalized industries, collective bargaining was highly centralized. "I After privatization, many industries shifted to concentrate more
power in the hands of local managers and greater importance was placed
on local management's right to initiate change.' 55 The cozy, centralized
management-labor understandings gave way to a greater emphasis on local negotiations. 56 Bargaining skills, therefore, had to be learned by labor officials at lower levels of representation, and this increased the role
of the shop stewards.' 5 7 The unions recognized that they needed to in148 Graham and Prosser, supra note 145, at 28.
149 Thomas, supra note 126, at 302.

150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 302-303.

153 Id. at 308.
154 Id.at 300.
155 Id.at 314.

156 Id. at 320. Otto Kahn-Freund recognized the beginnings of this decentralization in negotia-

tions long before privatization. See Clegg, supra note 46, at 23 ("Kan-Freund's perception of British industrial relations had undoubtedly undergone radical change by the time the Donovan Report
was written (1968). He had looked below the surface and become aware that intergroup relations
counted for much less than he had supposed in 1954. The 'permanent joint institutions' at industry
level were less influential in formulating and adopting standards than he had supposed. They did not
deserve the description 'mature' so much as 'decaying', undermined by the development of uncontrolled workplace bargaining which bred unofficial strikes.") Privatization would reinforce this
trend which Kahn-Freund had perceived some years before.
157 Thomas, supra note 126, at 319; see also Roberts, supra note 14, at 296 (more plant-level
negotiations by British Steel Corporation in the early 1980s). Cf Standing, supra note 112, at 96

(general decentralization of production to smaller establishments).
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vest more resources at the local level because more of the important negotiations were being done there and not at the centralized national

level.

158

The shop steward's role was enhanced by these developments and
the informal structure became one of the greatest benefits of the shop
steward system. In many ways, communication between management
and labor improved because the negotiations were at local instead of at
remote national levels. 15 9 Some companies found that the antagonistic
union-management attitudes actually began to fade as consultation, cooperation, and information flow increased."6
Since statutory regulation played a less important role in Britain,
greater flexibility had to be achieved through an altering of the balance of
power in labor-management relations. 161 Fortunately, in Britain this
could be done relatively easily. On the employer's side, more responsibility was given to the plant management to make local decisions and to
carry on localized negotiations. 6 2 And on the labor side, the shop steward system was already in place and the shop steward role was not so
strictly defined and regulated as to inhibit its ability to adapt and accommodate the changed situation. Because of the informal structure, which
had allowed for a great breadth of experience in playing different roles,
shop stewards could step into their new roles without being constrained
by mandatory regulations and procedures. Such flexibility was of critical
importance in ensuring that all of the workers' representational needs
were being met in the new negotiating framework.
Privatization in Britain brought about a decentralization in industrial relations. This trend increased the role of the shop stewards. Because the shop steward role was not strictly regulated, shop stewards
were able to play the new representational roles required. The question
arises whether the same will be true in Germany.
D.

Projected Effect of Privatization on German Industrial Relations

The German labor law system, marked by precise and limiting procedural regulations, will present obstacles during the privatization period. The strictly defined rules and regulations are likely to inhibit
responsiveness by negotiators on both the management and labor sides.
158
159
160
161
162

Thomas, supra note 126, at 319-320.
Id at 317.

Id
Vranken, supra note 112, at 159.
Thomas, supra note 126, at 314.
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Because of the tendency towards juridification in German labor law, flexibility is systemically impaired.
Wage bargaining may be cited as one prominent example of such
inflexibility. In Germany, collective bargaining negotiations on wages
are still centralized at the industry level. 163 These contracts bind all employers in that industry, and in effect prevent the evolution of a wider
variety of wage rates via localized agreements. 164 These wage rate contracts allow for great stability in the work force, but the costs of stability
are high because there can be no regional or local adjustments in wages
to meet changing economic circumstances. 165 The rigidity in such wage

contracts can be a distinct disadvantage in an economy adjusting to the
kind of changes Germany faces with reunification.' 6 6
Focusing on plant-level labor relations illustrates further potential
problems in the privatization of German industry. The British experience with privatization showed how industrial relations at the local level
became increasingly important while relations at the national level diminished in significance. 167 More responsibility was taken and more bar-

gaining decisions were made by plant-level representatives of
management and labor after privatization in Great Britain. The role of
the shop stewards became more important in this decentralized negotiating system.
A similar decentralization process is likely to occur in Germany as
the state-run industries of the East are dismantled. Signs of decentralization have already begun 16 and privatization should reinforce this trend
just as it did in Britain. 169 Goals of privatization, like the creation of an
enterprise culture, reducing government involvement in industry decision-making, and engaging the citizenry, 17 0 will be effected more easily
by allowing for greater freedom in industrial relations at lower levels.
With decentralization, the role of the German plant-level labor representation body, the works council, will be enhanced just as the role of
the shop steward was in Britain.' 7 ' The difference, though, is that in
Britain the shop stewards have no statutory impediments with which to
163 Fuerstenberg, supra note 57, at 615, 619-620; see also Brand, supra note 1, at 471.
164 Brand, supra note 1, at 471.
165 Id.

166 The wage rate contract is only one example of the overall tendency in German labor law
towards highly regulated agreements. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27, 57-92.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 154-158.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 113-116.
169 See supra text accompanying notes 155-162.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 139-142.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 159-162.

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

12:216(1991)

contend, whereas in Germany, the works councils are constrained by the
detailed procedures of the Works Constitution Act. 172 While shop stewards are restricted to a degree by custom and practice, they do not face
the rigid, legalistic framework which governs plant-level industrial relations in Germany. In Britain, the informality of the shop steward role
allowed shop stewards to adapt to meet the new requirements that privatization demanded, like a greater role in wage bargaining.1 73 In Germany, there is a danger that the formalism and detail of the Works
Constitution Act may not allow the works councils to be as flexible as
they will need to be.
The Works Constitution Act does not normally allow works councils to participate in wage negotiations or any other conditions fixed by
centralized collective negotiations. 74 The only exception provided is
when collective agreements specifically authorize the making of supplementary works agreements. 175 This principle of supplementary, localized works agreements, already recognized in the Works Constitution
Act, is one that must be expanded so that more decentralized negotiations are allowed. Using the British experience with privatization as a
guide, there will be pressure on management and labor to increasingly
decentralize the collective bargaining process. As plant-level negotiations become more important, works councils must be given a role in
negotiations, like wage bargaining, regardless of what the centralized
agreements say.
The German system needs to utilize flexible and less legalistic plantlevel industrial relations to meet the demands of privatization. 176 Privatization will bring changes and problems which nobody can anticipate
now. These problems will need to be addressed, and if the British example holds true, these problems will most likely be addressed at the plant
level. As unknowns, these problems are not subject to enumeration and
codification. Yet, the Works Constitution Act carries strict guidelines
177
defining what is subject to co-determination by the works councils.
The works councils are not completely constrained, however. In the
Works Constitution Act there is a provision allowing for some additional
See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 126, at 319 (localization of pay bargaining in British hotel
industry).
174 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. I, § 77(3).
175 Id
176 See. e.g., Cordova, supra note 112, at 651 (discussion of "adapting labour institutions and
industrial relations systems to current socio-economic pressures").
177 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. III, § 87.
172
173

236
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works council rights of co-determination. Part IV, Division IV, § 91
states:
Where a special burden is imposed on the employees as a result of changes
in jobs, operations, or the working environment that are in obvious contradiction to the established findings of ergonomics relating to the tailoring of
jobs to meet human requirements, the works council may request appropriate action to obviate, relieve, or compensate for the additional stress thus
imposed. If no agreement can be reached, the matter shall be decided by
the conciliation committee. The award of the conciliation committee shall
take the place of an agreement between the employer and the works
council.
The conciliation committee is set up to settle differences of opinion between management and labor and is composed of an equal number of
assessors chosen by the employer and the works council with an independent chairman accepted by both sides.17 The conciliation committee hears oral arguments and then votes, with the chairman casting a
ballot only in the event of a tie. 179
This provision, section 91 of the Works Constitution Act, must become the primary vehicle by which more negotiations reach the plant
level. As the effects of privatization become felt, works councils will
need to draw on this provision and use it as a means to empower themselves to effectuate local solutions to local problems. Section 91 provides
to the works councils the opportunity to seek relief from "special burdens" imposed by fundamental changes in the industrial environment.
Privatization of state-run industries, with the ensuing dislocations and
stress imposed on both labor and management, is precisely the kind of
fundamental change which this section envisions. Rather than rely on
formalized collective bargaining which probably will not address the specific local needs, works councils must seize section 91 of the Works Constitution Act and use it to ensure the negotiating flexibility that they will
require.
This section of the Works Constitution Act is critical because it
places the decision-making authority with the conciliation committee at
the local level. It is also imperative, however, that the conciliation committees agree to allow bargaining decisions to be made at the plant level
if there is an impasse between the employer and the works councils. If
the conciliation committees refuse to allow local bargaining, flexibility
will remain inhibited.
Employers should applaud efforts to increase plant-level bargaining
flexibility. German employers already recognize the need for flexibility
178 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. I, § 76(l)(2).
179 Works Act, supra note 72, part IV, div. I, § 76(3).
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and they fear that rigid rules will constrain their actions making the road
to privatization rockier.18 0 The challenges of privatization will apply to
employers and employees alike and cooperation will be critical. Newer
production techniques resulting from privatization will require more flexible work organization and more flexible labor representation. 1 ' Such
changes will affect both sides of the bargaining table.
It is true that such flexibility may carry problems with it. For example, unemployment, especially in former East Germany, may be exacerbated if there is too little structure to labor-management relations.182
Total deregulation could lead to "a return to the principles of unrestrained competition and the most primitive notions of the labour market. ' 18 3 Flexibility in wage structure is likely to lead to a downward
adjustment in wages. 18 4 Displacement of workers in Germany is less
likely to be mitigated by low-wage service jobs as it might in the United
States."8 5 These factors all may erode social solidarity leading to greater
societal and 7systemic problems in Germany.18 6 Union power may also be
8
weakened. 1
Such problems, though, all militate in favor of using section 91 of
the Works Constitution Act to increase flexibility at the plant level.
Surely, there will be upheavals in German industrial relations. But, ex180 Brand, supra note 1, at 470. Brand cites a high ranking official of Adam Opel, the German
subsidiary of General Motors, as saying, "We hope to gain considerable advantages in the East, not
from lower wages, but from more flexible rules, Japanese-style teamwork and less strict job classification. There is great risk that our rigid union regulations could be imposed on the East." (Quoted
from Washington Post, June 30, 1990).
181 Brand, supra note 1, at 470.
182 Id. Brand further suggests that unemployment will result from three developments: "(1) Establishments unprofitable to rehabilitate will be closed; (2) where productivity can be improved by
modem technology, better management, and so on, workers will be dismissed; and (3) as imports of
merchandise from West Germany and other countries displace indigenous products, workers will be
let go."
183 Cordova, supra note 112, at 651. But cf Vranken, supra note 112, at 146 (financially burdensome termination restrictions may exacerbate high unemployment rates).
184 Brand, supra note 1,at 472. Although initially West German unions have been able to maintain the level of wages, commentators concede that there will continue to be downward pressures on
wages due to competitive markets and excess labor availability. See, Passel, Economic Scene: East
Germany's Morning After, N.Y. Times, Aug 1, 1990, D32, col. 1.
185 Brand, supra note 1, at 470.
186 Id. at 468. Brand also notes the "segmentation of labor markets" leading to decreased solidarity among workers, at 472.
187 Brand, supra note 1, at 472. Brand points out that, unlike in other countries, East German
trade unions did not play a leading role in the events precipitating the downfall of the Communist
regime. Similarly, the trade unions throughout Germany did not play a large role in the first all
German election in November, 1990: "With ill-concealed anxiety, Ernst Breit, the head of the German Trade Union Federation, states (after an apologia for past relations with his East German
counterparts), 'There remains the fact that the November elections took place at best without, at
worst against the trade unions of the East and West.'"
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isting labor law structures can be used as a stabilizing force. By maintaining some adherence to established and proven systems, social
upheavals can be mitigated. Unlike in Britain where the tradition is
entirely based on custom and practice, German industry, workers and
employers alike, is accustomed to a statutory framework. Both workers
and management are comfortable with detailed procedures and statutory
underpinnings. Such a framework should not be entirely abandoned.
By using the existing Works Constitution Act, management and labor will keep most of the structure and organization to which they have
become accustomed. Yet, by utilizing section 91, they can inject more
flexibility into the structure. What is needed is to use the existing framework to ensure flexibility in handling unanticipated problems and to allow greater decision-making and negotiating at the plant level.
The new Germany will not be a bigger version of the Federal Republic. 8 It will be more focused on the East, "more eastward-looking,
thanks to its growing economic involvement with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe and to the pull of Berlin as the new German capital, even
189
if it does not become the seat of government."
This new feature of the German state also suggests a need for flexibility in plant-level industrial relations. In former East Germany, decades of exposure to a highly centralized trade union bureaucracy
created dissatisfaction, skepticism and distrust in workers. 90 Such distrust in bureaucracy is likely to affect workers' impressions of the new
labor system.19 1 A bitterness left over from Stalinist times is likely to
affect workers' attitudes towards authoritarian, centralized labor representation. 92 The idea of a centrally managed "welfare state" may be
associated with mismanagement and repression and therefore workers'
desires may turn more towards individual rather than "collective" development. 193 Socialism promised industrial democracy but that promise
was empty in the face of economic failure. Eastern workers' desires to
realize industrial democracy may manifest themselves in demands for responsive, attentive representatives at the local level rather than detached
188 Germany's Subdued Celebration, supra note 1, at 53.
189 Id.
190 Brand, supra note 1, at 472; see also Bernstein, Labor How New Germany Affects U.S., L.A.
Times., Oct. 9, 1990, D3, col. 4. ("In theory, East German workers through their unions had a
meaningful role in managing the state-owned companies. In practice, the unions were only 'transmission belts' used by the Communist government to control workers and prevent strikes").
191 Brand, supra note 1, at 472.
192 Id. at 471.
193 Id.; see also Markovits, supra note 2, at 757-758 (West German workers more likely to use
court system to assert individual autonomy, East German workers more likely to experience frustration due to their dependency on socialist state).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

12:216(1991)

and remote bureaucratic figureheads.'
V.

94

CONCLUSIONS

When British industry was privatized in the 1980s, more industrial
bargaining took place at the plant level rather than the national level.
This decentralization increased the role of the shop stewards, the British
plant-level labor representational body. British industrial relations structures at the plant level were not bound by formal, legalistic regulations.
Therefore, the shop stewards were able to adapt to the new bargaining
structure and facilitate improved collective negotiations.
Germany is facing a similar period of privatization in the 1990s. In
Germany, there should also be a decentralization of collective bargaining
placing more emphasis on discussions at the plant level. As in Britain,
the role of the plant-level labor representation bodies, the works councils,
will be enhanced. However, unlike in Britain, the works councils are
constrained more by the formal procedures embodied in the Works Constitution Act. To ensure the flexibility in negotiations that will be needed
to accommodate the changes wrought by privatization, the works coun-

cils must employ the provisions in the Works Constitution Act that enable them to participate more fully in plant-level bargaining.
Andrew J Ritten

194 Commentators have recognized the need for socialist labor law to also allow greater participation at the enterprise level. See, eg., Ivanov, Labor Law in Socialist Countries: Three Issues of General Theory, 11 COMP. LAB. L. 81 (1989) ("The labor field must become democratic to the extent of
creating opportunities for individual enterprises to establish their own legal norms," at 85;
"[I]ndustrial democracy must permit workers to become their own managers in solving problems at
the enterprise level," at 88).
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